I.
Introduction
Animal rights
means that all animals deserve certain kinds of consideration - consideration
of what is in their own best interests regardless of whether they are cute,
useful to humans, or an endangered species and regardless of whether any human
cares about them at all (just as a mentally-challenged human has rights even if
he or she is not cute or useful or even if everyone dislikes him or her). It
means recognizing that animals are not ours to use - for food, clothing,
entertainment, or experimentation. Animals are not property or objects. (Terri, 2008)
The philosopher
we have considered up to this point share a common assumption: Either animals
share full moral status with humans or, like rocks and other material objects,
they lack any moral status. Kant, Descartes, and Spinoza reasoned that, because
animals lack the rational capacities of humans, they are mere things
underserving of any respect. This position recognizes in human consciousness
greater degrees of value and potential value, in the same way that John Stuart
Mill distinguished degrees of quality among pleasures.
II.
Partial Moral Status of Animal’s rights
This view might
also grant that animal have important rights but deny that they have all the
rights of human beings. Thus, although they have the rights to be treated
humanely and not to be tortured, they lack rights to social support through our
welfare system. This view also distinguishes degrees of inherent worth among
animals, depending on the extent of their capacities to feel pain and pleasure,
to act purposefully, and to interact socially with one another and with humans. (Sam-Ang Sam,
2009)
III.
Opponents argue
Opponents argue that animal
research is cruel, immoral, and unnecessary. “The question,” wrote English
philosopher Jeremy Bentham, discussing animals used in experiments, “is not can
they reason, nor can they talk, but can they suffer?” More recently, Peter
Singer, in Animal Liberation, argues that all species that can feel pain
and suffering animal as well as human deserve equal consideration. Many people
believe that animals are no less complex than humans in their capacity to feel
emotions and to suffer pain. In this view, the infliction of discomfort, pain,
suffering, and death on laboratory animals, which are incapable of giving
consent to experimental procedures, is purely wrong.
Opponents also dispute
the scientific validity of results obtained from animals. Many observers
question whether data obtained from animals can be reliably applied to humans.
They argue that physiological differences between animals and humans make them
unsuitable as experimental models. Animal rights activists cite figures of the
United States Government Accountability Office (GAO) showing that 52 percent of
the new drugs marketed between 1976 and 1985 caused adverse reactions that were
not predicted by animal studies. Opponents of animal experimentation also point
out that experimental animals are under great stress, often confined in small
cages or held in special equipment designed to restrict movement. The stress
created by confinement, and by repeated handling for experimental procedures,
may significantly alter an animal’s physiological functioning, rendering any
experimental observations meaningless.
Researchers in labs worldwide
currently experiment with a variety of alternatives, such as in vitro
methods, which use cell and tissue cultures in place of whole animals. One such
test-tube method, designed to replace rabbits in evaluating the skin-irritating
properties of new chemicals, has already won approval from the United States
government, which requires extensive testing before chemicals can be used in
commercial products. Another promising avenue involves developing more
sophisticated methods of statistically analyzing data. Such 'data-mining'
measures mean that fewer animals are required for tests, or that animals are
completely unnecessary. Powerful computer programs, designed to imitate
biological functions and demonstrate how a living body reacts to toxic
chemicals or disease pathogens, are yet another alternative.
Animal rights activists
representing the extreme view support a complete ban on animal experimentation
in favor of alternative methods. Despite increased interest in and success with
alternatives.
As for animals, since they cannot
understand contracts, they obviously cannot sign; and since they cannot sign,
they have no rights. Like children, however, some animals are the objects of
the sentimental interest of others. You, for example, love your dog or cat. So
those animals that enough people care about (companion animals, whales, baby
seals, the American bald eagle), though they lack rights themselves, will be
protected because of the sentimental interests of people. I have, then,
according to contract Arianism, no duty directly to your dog or any other
animal, not even the duty not to cause them pain or suffering; my duty not to
hurt them is a duty I have to those people who care about what happens to them.
As for other animals, where no or little sentimental interest is present - in
the case of farm animals, for example, or laboratory rats - what duties we have
grown weaker and weaker, perhaps to vanishing point. The pain and death they
endure, though real, are not wrong if no one cares about them. (King,
Christopher, 2009)
IV.
Animal abuse
We begin by asking how the moral
status of animals has been understood by thinkers who deny that animals have
rights. Then we test the mettle of their ideas by seeing how well they stand up
under the heat of fair criticism. If we start our thinking in this way, we soon
find that some people believe that we have no duties directly to animals, that
we owe nothing to them, that we can do nothing that wrongs them. Rather, we can
do wrong acts that involve animals, and so we have duties regarding them,
though none to them. Such views may be called indirect duty views. By way of
illustration: suppose your neighbor kicks your dog. Then your neighbor has done
something wrong, but not to your dog. The wrong that has been done is a wrong
to you. After all, it is wrong to upset people, and your neighbor’s kicking
your dog upsets you. So you are the one who is wronged, not your dog. Or again:
by kicking your dog your neighbor damages your property. And since it is wrong
to damage another person's property, your neighbor has done something wrong -
to you, of course, not to your dog. Your neighbor no more wrongs your dog than
your car would be wronged if the windshield were smashed. Your neighbor’s
duties involving your dog are indirect duties to you. More generally, all of
our duties regarding animals are indirect duties to one another — to humanity.
How could someone try to justify
such a view? Someone might say that your dog doesn't feel anything and so isn't
hurt by your neighbor’s kick, doesn't care about the pain since none is felt,
is as unaware of anything as is your windshield. Someone might say this, but no
rational person will, since, among other considerations, such a view will
commit anyone who holds it to the position that no human being feels pain
either - that human beings also don't care about what happens to them. A second
possibility is that though both humans and your dog are hurt when kicked, it is
only human pain that matters. But, again, no rational person can believe this.
Pain is pain wherever it occurs. If your neighbors’ causing you pain is wrong
because of the pain that is caused, we cannot rationally ignore or dismiss the
moral relevance of the pain that your dog feels. (Regan)
V.
Conclusion
In conclusion, as we know already
about why people feel bios to the animal’s rights, but we still support to give
some rights to animals and rare animals in order to keep the animal for our
generation. So, we should stop abuse to animals. Although, animal could harm to
people and it use instinct but we could think about the pain and pleasure.
Bibliography
King, Christopher. (2009). Animal Experimentation.
USA.
Regan, T. (n.d.). The Case for Animal Rights. In Defense
of Animals (pp. 13-26). New York: Basil Blackwell.
Sam-Ang Sam, D. A. (2009). In Introduction To
Ethics. Phnom Penh: Pannasatra University of Cambodia.
Terri. (2008). Animal Rights Issues. Retrieved
july 5, 2012, from http://www.animalsuffering.com
